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Abstract
Background: Since 2011, civil war has crippled Syria leaving much of the population without access to healthcare.
Various field hospitals have been clandestinely set up to provide basic healthcare but few have been able to provide
quality surgical care. In 2012, Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) began providing surgical care in the Jabal al-Akrad region
of north-western Syria. Based on the MSF experience, we describe, for the period 5th September 2012 to 1st January
2014: a) the volume and profile of surgical cases, b) the volume and type of anaesthetic and surgical procedures
performed, and c) the intraoperative mortality rate.
Methods: A descriptive study using routinely collected MSF programme data. Quality surgical care was assured
through strict adherence to the following minimum standards: adequate infrastructure, adequate water and sanitation
provisions, availability of all essential disposables, drugs and equipment, strict adherence to hygiene requirements and
universal precautions, mandatory use of sterile equipment for surgical and anaesthesia procedures, capability for blood
transfusion and adequate human resources.
Results: During the study period, MSF operated on 578 new patients, of whom 57 % were male and median age
was 25 years (Interquartile range: 21–32 years). Violent trauma was the most common surgical indication
(n-254, 44 %), followed by obstetric emergencies (n-191, 33 %) and accidental trauma (n-59, 10 %). In total,
712 anaesthetic procedures were performed. General anaesthesia without intubation was the most common
type of anaesthesia (47 % of all anaesthetics) followed by spinal anaesthesia (25 %). A total of 831 surgical
procedures were performed, just over half being minor/wound care procedures and nearly one fifth, caesarean
sections. There were four intra-operative deaths, giving an intra-operative mortality rate of 0.7 %.
Conclusions: Surgical needs in a conflict-afflicted setting like Syria are high and include both combat and non-combat
indications, particularly obstetric emergencies. Provision of quality surgical care in a complex and volatile setting like
this is possible providing appropriate measures, supported by highly experienced staff, can be implemented that allow
a specific set of minimum standards of care to be adhered to. This is particularly important when patient outcomes - as
a reflection of quality of care - are difficult to assess.
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Background
Surgical care is an integral part of any healthcare system
and yet in low and middle income countries (LMICs)
access to such care is often limited [1, 2]. When such
contexts are in turn afflicted by conflict, the situation
becomes even more dire: not only is access further ham-
pered, but this at a time when the surgical needs of the
population are likely to be greater (war-related injuries
in addition to non-war related conditions such as obstet-
ric emergencies and infections) [3].
Since 2011, Syria has been crippled by a brutal civil
war resulting in what has been described by the United
Nations (UN) as the worst humanitarian crisis in recent
times. Approximately 220,000 people (mostly civilians)
are estimated to have died since the conflict began and
it is estimated that 12.2 million people are in need of hu-
manitarian assistance, 7.6 million of whom are internally
displaced [4]. Intense fighting and complicated relief
operations due to political barriers have left millions of
Syrians without access to essential services [5], access to
health services being the greatest challenge of all [6].
Access to basic health care, including surgical care, is
severely hampered by restricted ability to move, the
destruction and breakdown of health infrastructure,
shortage of medical supplies, lack of human resources
and threats of kidnappings and killings by different
armed groups on medical staff [7, 8]. Reports estimate
that more Syrians have died due to health complications
resulting from inadequate health care services than as a
direct consequence of the conflict [4].
Various field hospitals have been clandestinely set up
to provide some level of healthcare [9, 10] but very few
have managed to establish the capacity to provide quality
surgical care.
Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), an international, in-
dependent, humanitarian medical organisation, provides
medical assistance to vulnerable populations, including
those affected by conflicts. Surgical care is an integral
part of its work. Shortly after the conflict in Syria esca-
lated into a full-scale civil war in 2012, MSF-OCB
(Operational Centre Brussels) intervened in the Jabal al-
Akrad region of north-western Syria, where it estab-
lished a field hospital that included a surgical centre.
Despite major challenges, MSF-OCB managed to pro-
vide surgery for nearly 600 patients.
To date, there have been few published studies report-
ing on the provision of surgical activities in conflict
settings. Those that have, have generally reported on the
typology of the surgical care provided [3, 11], remote
models of care [12], the feasibility of performing specific
surgical procedures [13, 14], and the surgical manage-
ment and related outcomes for specific conditions
[15, 16]. One study from Syria [17] described how a field
hospital, which included surgical activities, was set up
and organised, but the study only reported on 28 surgi-
cal patients. The ‘how’ of providing quality surgical care
for larger numbers of patients presenting with different
surgical indications in a complex war-torn context like
Syria has not been formally reported on.
Based on the MSF-OCB experience of providing surgi-
cal care in the Jabal al-Akrad region of Syria between
September 2012 and January 2014, this study thus aims
to report on how quality surgical care can be provided
in a complex conflict setting and what volume and type
of surgical activities are feasible. Specific objectives were
to report on a) the volume and profile of surgical cases
seen, b) the volume and type of anaesthetic and surgical




This was a descriptive study using routinely collected
MSF programme data.
Study setting
Jabal al-Akrad is a rural mountainous region in north-
west Syria close to the Turkish border, with a population
of about 150,000. As a result of the civil war, the region
has seen extensive fighting between armed groups and the
Syrian army and also between different armed groups.
The MSF field hospital was set up and functional by
the end of August 2012. Initially the hospital was orga-
nised within a cave, but in November 2012, due to inse-
curity (the position of the cave was considered to be too
close to a frontline and military position) and limited
space, the field hospital was moved and re-established in
a permanent brick structure (an abandoned chicken
farm) located 6 km from the Turkish border. The
provision of surgical care was shifted from the cave to
the chicken farm in just one day. Several days prior to
this shift, a new surgical tent was erected in the chicken
farm and a proportion of the emergency/ surgical care
supplies and pharmacy stock was transferred to the
chicken farm. On the day of the move, the operating
table and operating lamp were shifted from the cave to
the chicken farm together with the anaesthetist (in the
first convoy) and the surgeon and emergency physician
(in the second convoy); there was only a 90 min window
during which surgical activities had to be put on hold.
The remaining supplies at the cave were transferred to
the chicken cave over the following two days.
MSF surgical activities
MSF adapted a standardised design for organising its
surgical complex and implemented standardised proce-
dures for surgical activities and training based on in-
ternal policy guidelines. The surgical centre comprised
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of one operating room (OR) in the form of an inflatable
tent, together with all the necessary supportive units in-
cluding an emergency department (with a resuscitation,
treatment and observation area), a pre- and post-operative
ward, a sterilisation unit, a basic laboratory and blood
transfusion capacity.
Surgical activities were overseen by a team of experi-
enced international staff (one surgeon, one anaesthetist,
one emergency doctor and one OR nurse) and sup-
ported by a number of local nurses (recruited from the
local community and trained accordingly to assist with
surgical activities). Staff turnover among local personnel
was minimal while international staff were rotated on a
monthly basis - the whole team being replaced by a new
one. On several occasions, international staff members,
including those in the surgical team, had to be evacuated
because of security constraints. On three occasions, the
evacuation period was 15 days or longer and during
these evacuations periods surgical activities were tem-
porarily suspended. During these times, the hospital
remained open and patient care and management was
overseen by local health personnel.
An important part of the MSF intervention included
setting up an effective referral system with appropriate
services in Turkey. If a patient arrived at the field hos-
pital in a critical condition that could not be surgically
managed because of resource constraints, damage con-
trol surgery [18] was performed and the patient was re-
ferred to Turkey. Patients with head trauma were also
referred. Furthermore, by providing orthopaedic surgical
materials (mainly external fixators) to a nearby Syrian
hospital with the human resource capacity to provide
orthopaedic surgery, MSF was able to refer some of its
orthopaedic cases to this hospital.
Emergency care, including surgery, was available 24 h
a day every day, and all care and treatment was provided
free of charge. Appropriate triage systems were put in
place to try to ensure a more efficient use of limited re-
sources and to better manage heavy caseloads during
busy times. During times of ‘normal’ care, the South
African Triage scale was used in the emergency de-
partment and the process of triage was task-shifted
to nursing staff so that the few available doctors
could concentrate their efforts on treating patients
once triaged; during times of a mass casualty inci-
dent (MCI), START (simple triage and rapid treat-
ment) [19] was implemented - a triage method used
to quickly classify victims during a MCI based on
the severity of their injury.
Minimum standards of surgical care
Table 1 summarises the pre-requisites considered by
MSF to be essential for performing quality surgical inter-
ventions in Jabal al-Akrad and the measures taken to meet
these conditions. There were seven pre-requisites: i) ad-
equate infrastructure, (including protection from the
external environment and appropriate electricity and
lighting), ii) adequate water and sanitation provisions,
(waste management being a key priority), iii) availability of
all essential disposables, drugs and equipment, iv) strict
adherence to hygiene requirements and universal precau-
tions, v) mandatory use of sterile equipment for surgical
and anaesthesia procedures, vi) capability for blood trans-
fusion, and vii) adequate human resources in quantity and
quality. In order to meet these minimum standards in the
context of Syria, various measures had to be taken. Some
of the key measures included: i) adapting the standard
field hospital design - this to meet the functional/medical
needs of the hospital, ensure the ‘safe’ circuit of patients in
terms of hygiene standards and accommodate for the
challenges around lack of space, lack of infrastructure and
lack of security; ii) ensuring that highly experienced
personnel were in place to oversee the design and timely
implementation of these technical adaptations (medical
staff - who could clearly identify the needs of the hospital -
and logistics staff with extensive experience in emergency
hospital design and set-up) and iii) establishing a clandes-
tine supply line from Turkey to ensure a regular supply of
logistical materials, fuel and medical supplies.
Study population
The study population included all new patients who
underwent any surgical intervention at the MSF field
hospital in Jabal al-Akrad between 5th September 2012
and 1st January 2014.
Data collection and analysis
For this analysis, a surgical intervention was defined as
any intervention performed in the OR that required
local, regional and / or general anaesthesia. One surgical
intervention corresponded with one patient entrance
into the OR. The data collection tool in place was
designed such that a maximum of three surgical proce-
dures could be recorded per surgical intervention. Data
on all surgical interventions were entered into a standar-
dised logbook and transcribed into an electronic data-
base (Microsoft Excel). These data were then aggregated
at MSF-OCB headquarters and reviewed for complete-
ness and accuracy. Data pertaining to this study were
sourced from the electronic database and included the
following variables: date of surgical intervention, patient
gender, patient age, the American Society of Anaesthe-
siologists (ASA) score (a classification system for de-
scribing a patient’s pre-operative physical status, see
Table 2), indication for surgery (grouped as accidental
trauma, violent trauma, obstetric care and other), type
of anaesthesia used (general anaesthesia without
intubation, general anaesthesia with intubation, spinal
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Table 1 Measures taken by MSF to ensure the provision of quality surgical care in Jabal Akkrad, Syria
Essential conditions for the provision of quality
surgical care
Measures taken to achieve these conditions in the cave and chicken farm
Adequate infrastructure, including protection from
the external environment and appropriate
electricity and lighting.
• The standard design of the field hospital was adapted to meet the functional/medical
needs of the hospital, to ensure the ‘safe’ circuit of surgical patients (in terms of
hygiene standards) and to accommodate for the challenges around lack of quality space,
lack of infrastructure and lack of security, all the while ensuring that quality care of care
would not be compromised. Essential for the design and timely implementation of these
technical solutions was the presence of highly experienced personnel (medical staff who
could clearly identify the functional needs of the hospital and logistics staff with extensive
experience in emergency hospital design and set-up).
• An inflatable tent served as the operating theatre in order to ensure a minimum level
of cleanliness. To ensure protection from environmental factors (such as rain, wind,
dust and falling debris from the roof of the cave), plastic sheets formed a cover for
the floor of the tent and wooden frames lined with plastic sheets formed the roof
of the tent. The same features were put in place once the field hospital relocated
to an abandoned chicken farm.
• An entirely new electrical wiring system was installed, respecting all necessary electrical
safety measures. In addition, two generators were installed (one as back up), to ensure
a reliable electricity supply during power cuts.
• Establishing the field hospital in the abandoned chicken farm in particular, required a
huge coordinated global effort between the field team in Syria, headquarter teams in
Brussels and a team based in Turkey: the field team selected the site (the chicken farm)
and then sent photos to the emergency team in Brussels who, together with the
logistics team, provided the team based in Turkey with a list of all the required materials.
The Turkey based team obtained these materials through local procurement and then
made the necessary arrangements to transport these materials across the Turkish border
into Syria. While these preparations went on, logistics staff in the field set about designing
the new hospital. This coordinated effort enabled the hospital to be set up within 3–4
days of relocating from the cave.
• A clandestine supply line from Turkey was essential for obtaining the logistical equipment
and materials needed to set up the field hospital
Adequate water and sanitation provisions, waste
management being a key priority
• Minimum water requirements were pre-set at 100 L water/anaesthesia and 40–60 L water/person/
day in the IPD. At the cave, three water points were installed: one for emergency care, one for
scrubbing, and one for sterilisation; at the abandoned chicken farm, a 30,000 L water tank was
already in place. To avoid potential contamination of water with previously used toxic chemicals
at the farm, the tank was emptied, cleaned, disinfected with chlorine and filled again.
• A new canal system was installed in just four days and water points were installed in seven
areas of care-triage, consultation & emergency care, resuscitation, the inpatient department,
scrubbing, sterilization, and laboratory.
• Several easy-to-clean tiled toilet units with hand washing points were installed and connected
up to a large soak-away pit built outside (not accessible to patients or visitors).
• Surgical activities produce large quantities of organic, liquid and dangerous waste and there
should be proper segregation of the waste material produced. While operating from the cave,
there was only space enough for one waste pit which therefore had to serve as a refuse for
all of the different types of waste. Once the hospital relocated to the abandoned chicken farm,
a waste-management zone with an appropriate number of pits was built and waste could
be segregated according to protocol.
Availability of all essential disposables, drugs and
equipment
• A regular supply of drugs, material and equipment is an essential MSF pre-requisite in order
to guarantee no ruptures in care. A clandestine supply line from Turkey ensured this, with
supplies being transported across the Turkish border either by truck (with support of the
Turkish Red Crescent) or hand-carried.
Strict adherence to hygiene requirements and
universal precautions
• Hydro-alcoholic solution was made readily available.
• A clean sufficient water supply and sanitation provisions were ensured (as outlined above).
• In the absence of water hot enough to adequately clean dirty laundry, chlorine was added
to the cold water supplying the washing machine.
• Strict adherence to infection control protocols
Mandatory use of sterile equipment for surgical
and anaesthesia procedures
• In the cave, dry-heat sterilization was installed
• At the abandoned chicken farm, a gas barrel was installed in a separate and protected
ventilated place, and linked to the heater of the autoclave inside the building. To generate
the correct circuit of activities (from dirty, to clean, and finally to sterile) the sterilization
service was provided in a large space, with two wicket gates for the “entry” and “exit” of material.
Blood transfusion capability • In the cave, there was no blood bank in place. Even so, several blood transfusions were
performed when indicated if suitable donors could be identified on the spot.
• Once the surgical center moved to the abandoned chicken farm, a blood bank was set
up with transfusion therapy restricted to life saving indications.
Trelles et al. Conflict and Health  (2015) 9:36 Page 4 of 8
anaesthesia, local/ regional anaesthesia, or combined an-
aesthesia), type of surgical procedure (minor, wound care,
caesarean section, visceral surgery, orthopaedic surgery,
other) and intra-operative outcome (dead/alive).
Intraoperative mortality was defined as any death oc-
curring during the induction of anaesthesia, the inter-
vention itself, or the immediate recovery period (i.e., the
time during which a patient is monitored and managed
in a post-anaesthetic recovery unit [20]).
Data were analysed in STATA/IC version 11.0 (Stata
corporation, Texas 77845, USA) using summary statistics.
Ethics approval
The study met the Medecins Sans Frontieres Ethics re-
view Board (Geneva, Switzerland) approved criteria for
studies of routinely collected data. The study was con-
ducted as a retrospective analysis of routine programme
data, and thus informed consent was not sought from
study subjects. No patient Identifying information was
included in the final analysis or reported on.
Results
Volume and profile of surgical cases
Between 5th September 2012 and 1st January 2014, MSF
performed surgery on 578 new patients. Table 3 shows
the profile of these patients. Males comprised 57 % of
the cases and the median overall age was 25 years (Inter-
quartile range: 21–32 years). The majority of patients
had an ASA score of 1 indicating good pre-operative
physical status. Violent trauma was the most common
surgical indication (n-254, 44 %); the remaining indica-
tions for surgery were non-violent in type, most com-
monly being obstetric emergencies (n-191, 33 %) and
accidental trauma (n-59, 10 %).
Anaesthetic and surgical procedures performed
Table 4 shows the type of anaesthetic and surgical proce-
dures performed. In total, 712 anaesthetic procedures
were performed on the 578 patients (one anaesthetic per
patient entrance into the OR: 578 new patient entrances
and 134 re-entrances for surgical re-interventions). Gen-
eral anaesthesia without intubation was the most com-
mon type of anaesthesia (used in 47 % of surgical
interventions), followed by spinal anaesthesia (25 %).
Spinal procedures were used for 84 % of Caesarean sec-
tions (data not shown in the Table).
A total of 831 surgical procedures were performed on the
578 patients. Just over half of these were minor-wound pro-
cedures and nearly one fifth, caesarean sections.
Intra-operative mortality
There were four intra-operative deaths among the 578
patients, equating to an intra-operative mortality rate of
0.7 %. The four deaths were among cases injured by
bomb blasts: one with multiple severe traumas, one with
a severe hip fracture, one with a lung laceration and
haemo-peritoneum, and one with inferior vena cava and
Table 1 Measures taken by MSF to ensure the provision of quality surgical care in Jabal Akkrad, Syria (Continued)
Adequate human resources in quantity and
quality
• Human resource requirements focused on sufficiency in numbers and sufficiency in skill level.
• Logisticians had to be recruited to organise the surgical centre, while surgical and aesthesia
practitioners were needed to perform the required surgical procedures.
• A recruitment call was made for expatriate staff with previous experience of working in war
torn settings. The technical referents devised a simplified design for the surgical centre and
then up to 70 Syrian staff (plumbers, carpenters, bricklayers etc.) were employed to rehabilitate
the abandoned chicken farm into a hospital with an operating theatre (taking just four days).
Table 2 American Society of Anaesthesiologists (ASA) score
Class 1: → Patient in apparent good health notwithstanding his
surgical problem
→ Limitations on activity: none
→ Limitations on activity: none
→ Excluded: persons at extremes of age (very young, very old)
Class 2: → Patient with mild systemic disease (e.g., mild hypertension,
mild-moderate anaemia)
→ Patient’s health: disease of one body system
→ Status of underlying disease: well controlled
→ Limitations on activity: none
→Danger of death: none
Class 3: → Patient with systemic disease severe enough to limit
activity but not incapacitating
→ Patient’s health: disease of more than one body system
or one major system
→ Limitations on activity: present but not incapacitated
→Danger of death: no immediate danger
Class 4: → Patient with severe incapacitating disease that is a
constant threat to life
→ Patient’s health: poor, with at least one severe disease
→ Status of underlying disease: poorly controlled or end-stage
→ Limitations on activity: incapacitated
→Danger of death: possible
Class 5: →Moribund patient not expected to survive 24 h with
or without surgery
→ Patient’s health: very poor, moribund
→ Limitations on activity: incapacitated
→Danger of death: imminent
Class 6: → A declared brain-dead patient whose organs are being
removed for donor purposes
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pancreatic tears. Of the 154 newborns delivered by
Caesarean section, 6 (4 %) died.
Discussion
In a conflict setting with extreme security constraints,
where access to surgical care is severely restricted, MSF
was able to adapt its modus-operandi and implement a
model of emergency surgical care with good outcomes.
Quality care was assured through strict adherence to a
specific set of minimum standards of care and, over a
16 month period, MSF operated on nearly 600 patients -
mainly young adults comprising slightly more males
than females. Violent trauma was the most common rea-
son for surgery, followed by obstetric emergencies which
accounted for one third of all cases. Minor/wound care
surgery made up just over half of all the surgical proce-
dures performed, and Caesarean sections one fifth. The
intra-operative mortality rate was low at 0.7 %.
The strengths of this study were that it included i) a
large number of patients, ii) routine collection of data in
the field hospital was thorough and standardised, and iii)
the study adhered to the STROBE (Strengthening the
Reporting of Observational Studies in Epidemiology)
guidelines [21] and sound ethics principles for conducting
and reporting of observational studies [22]. There were a
number of study limitations. First, the only surgical out-
come assessed was intra-operative mortality. Other useful
indicators might have included post-operative infection
rates, other post-operative complications and peri-operative
mortality. Unfortunately however, these could not be com-
prehensively assessed due to major contextual constraints
in patient follow-up. Second, given the inherent limitations
of an observational study like this, we cannot directly attri-
bute the low intra-operative mortality rate to the measures
implemented to ensure a minimum standard of care. Fi-
nally, data on patient referrals to Turkey were not routinely
collected and therefore could not be reported on. Despite
these limitations, the study raises a number of issues that
merit discussion, particularly in relation to the provision of
quality surgical care in conflict settings.
First, although surgical care in conflict settings has
often been considered to be primarily indicated for war
victims, our study shows that in addition to combat-
related cases, a large number of cases are non-combat
related, tending to represent the regular burden of surgi-
cal disease found in the general population e.g., obstet-
rical emergencies and infections. This corroborates the
findings of other studies from conflict settings [3, 11]. In
fact, non-combat related surgical needs are likely to be
even greater during times of conflict due to the popula-
tion being more exposed to factors such as poor hygiene,
infectious diseases and poor access to obstetric care [23].
In this regard it is essential that surgical teams who
come to operate in such settings come prepared (i.e.,
have an appropriate team of surgeons and the neces-
sary surgical equipment) to manage both combat
and non-combat related surgical cases such as ob-
stetric emergencies.
Table 3 Profile of all new surgical patients managed at the MSF




















Violent trauma 254 (44)
Obstetric emergencies 191 (33)
Accidental trauma 59 (10)
Non-traumatic and non-obstetric pathologies 74 (13)
IQR Interquartile range, ASA American Society of Anaesthesiologists
Table 4 Type of anaesthesia and surgical procedures performed
at the MSF field hospital in Jabal al-Akrad, Syria (5th September
2012-1st January 2014)
Variable n (%)
Type of anaesthetic procedures (n-712)
General without intubation 337 (47)
Spinal 179 (25)
General with intubation 122 (17)
Local/regional 53 (7)
Combined 21 (3)
Type of surgical procedures (n-831)
Minor/ Wound care 450 (54)
Caesarean-sections 153 (18)
Visceral surgery 114 (14)
Orthopaedic/specialised surgery 64 (8)
Gynaeco-obstetric surgerya 50 (6)
aExcluding caesarean sections
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Second, although we cannot attribute the low intra-
operative mortality seen in our study to the surgical inter-
vention itself, our outcomes are extremely favourable
when compared to the outcomes reported by another
study conducted in a clandestine field hospital in Syria
[17]. In this study, among the 28 patients operated on -
the most common procedures being vascular procedures,
orthopaedic procedures and abdominal exploration - two
patients died intra-operatively (giving an intraoperative
mortality rate of 7 %). Although we can only speculate,
the significantly lower intra-operative mortality rate seen in
our study may be due to a number of factors including i)
patients dying before arriving at the MSF hospital, ii) better
quality of surgical care in the MSF hospital, and/or iii) less
severe cases making up the MSF surgical caseload (severe
cases being referred to Turkey for management). This latter
point raises an important issue - namely the importance of
surgical teams recognising when they do not have the cap-
acity to manage particular cases. Patients can pay a high
price for sub-standard surgical care - post-operative infec-
tions, disability and even death - and thus the principle of
‘do no harm’ should prevail at all times. When it cannot be
upheld, we would strongly assert that such surgery should
not be undertaken; this is when a good referral sys-
tem to higher level care becomes a key responsibility
of the surgical team.
Third, while recognising the limitations inherent with
an observational study like ours, together with the fact
that our only outcome measure was restricted to intra-
operative mortality, the constraints of this particular
context make it very difficult to suggest a more suitable
study design and to propose that additional outcome
measures should have been assessed. When circum-
stances allow, we would strongly recommend that
indicators such as post-operative infection rates, post-
operative complications and peri-operative mortality be
measured in order to better assess the overall effect of a
surgical intervention. In the context of Syria however
this was not possible due to a number of factors, includ-
ing: i) the need to discharge patients as early as possible-
because of both the limited number of hospital beds and
the high security risk of keeping patients at the hospital -
thus limiting in-patient monitoring time, ii) patients
being unable to return or be referred back to the hos-
pital for follow-up due to insecurity and transportation
constraints, and iii) patient tracing and follow-up via cell
phone not being possible due to the disruption of tele-
phone signal.
The difficulties around post-operative monitoring and
patient follow-up are added justification for MSF’s insist-
ence that minimum standards of surgical care be strictly
adhered to. According to the concepts outlined in the
Donabedian Model, quality of healthcare can be consid-
ered in relation to three domains: “structure,” “process,”
and “outcomes” [24].” Structure” describes the factors that
affect the context in which care is delivered (e.g., hospital
buildings, equipment, human resources); “process” de-
scribes the transactions between patients and healthcare
providers during healthcare delivery (i.e., those factors that
influence how healthcare is delivered); and “outcomes” re-
fers to the effects of healthcare on the health status of pa-
tients/populations. The minimum standards of surgical
care endorsed by MSF ensure that all the necessary “struc-
tural” elements are in place for maximising quality of care.
Meanwhile, MSF ensures that important ‘process’ factors
are upheld through comprehensive and standardised pro-
tocols for all levels of care, appropriate record keeping
and comprehensive data collection systems. In conflict
settings, such as Syria, where outcome measurement - as
a reflection of quality of care - is often going to be a chal-
lenge, we would advocate that when minimum standards
of care are rigorously endorsed, and guidelines and proto-
cols strictly adhered to, we can reasonably assume that pa-
tients are receiving good quality care and that the results
of our activities are satisfactory. This rationale is sup-
ported by the fact that across different MSF surgical
projects (where there are notable differences in context,
surgical caseload, and surgical capacity, but where the
same minimum standards of care are strictly adhered to),
intra-operative mortality and post-operative rates are con-
sistently low [25].
Finally, based on MSF’s experience of providing surgi-
cal care in Syria, there are a number of lessons learnt
and practice implications that could help to inform other
actors who set out to provide surgical care in conflict
settings like Syria. First, the demands are high: surgical
centres often need to be erected in a short time frame
and usually from scratch, and temporary structures are
often the only feasible option which poses a number of
challenges particularly in relation to ensuring a mini-
mum quality of care. Second, pertaining to the principle
of ‘do no harm’ we would strongly recommend that sur-
gical activities only be offered if a specific complement
of minimum measures can be implemented to assure
quality of care (adequate infrastructure, a clean and suf-
ficient water supply, effective sterilisation, comprehen-
sive guidelines and protocols etc.). This is only likely to
be possible when innovative, adapted and well-organised
ways of working can be implemented, supported by
highly experienced staff. Third, beyond the provision of
surgical activities, appropriate referral networks should
ideally be identified where possible, so that patients who
cannot be managed due to resource constraints can be re-
ferred for appropriate care. Related to this, complimentary
support (e.g., the supply of specific surgical materials) to
other actors in the field who have the human resource
capacity to provide general and more specialised surgery
can improve overall access to a greater scope of surgical
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care. Finally, a certain level of preparedness is essential, in-
cluding having i) policies on minimum standards accord-
ing to best practice pre-established, ii) standardised
protocols for all levels of care (safety, infection control,
surgical etc., iii) standardised monitoring and evaluation
tools in place so that reliable data can be collected
[26]- including, where possible, patient follow-up data
(infection rates, complications, peri-operative mortality)
and data on patient referrals, iv) a pool of surgical
personnel to recruit from, and v) the surgical capacity to
manage both war-wounded and non-trauma emergency
cases, such as obstetrical emergencies.
Conclusion
In conclusion, surgical needs in a conflict-afflicted set-
ting like Syria are high and include both combat and a
large number of non-combat indications, particularly ob-
stetric emergencies. Provision of quality surgical care in
a volatile and complex setting like this is possible pro-
viding appropriate measures, supported by highly experi-
enced staff, can be implemented that allow a specific set
of minimum standards of care to be adhered to. This is
particularly important when patient outcomes - as a re-
flection of quality of care - are difficult to monitor and
assess.
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